Encryption Isn’t Enough: Compromising a Payment Processor using Math

During a security engagement with my employer, iteratec, I found and reported a security issue that allowed me to completely compromise the internal customer service frontend of a payment processor, which would have let us steal customer information or trigger payments.

What makes this issue interesting is both the internal mechanisms of the issue (an entertaining case of incorrect use of cryptography) and the things it can teach us about secure system design, and how seemingly small architecture decisions can exacerbate the severity of a vulnerability. In this article, we will start with a high-level view of the system, and then drill down into one part until we reach the problem. We will then discuss how and why the attack works, before zooming back out and discussing how a more robust system design could have mitigated the issue.

So, without further ado, let’s dig in.

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